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ABSTRACT 
From 1980 to 1992, emerging and developing countries grew by 3.4 percent per year.  Their 
annual rate of growth increased to 5.4 percent between 1993 and 2012.  No such increase 
occurred for advanced nations, whose average growth from 1980-2012 was roughly constant 
(excluding the impact of the 2008-09 Recession). Developing nations turned themselves around 
by embracing discipline—sustained commitment to a pragmatic and flexible growth strategy.  
Three illustrations of discipline through the lens of trade, fiscal, and debt reforms in the 
developing world offer relevant, practical lessons for recovery in advanced economies and 
continued catch-up growth in developing nations. 
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Not long ago, developing and emerging economies were known as “Third World” nations 
mired in poverty, debt crises, stratospheric inflation rates, and chronic instability while advanced 
countries seemed to hold the keys to prosperity. Tables have turned. The first decade of the 21st 
century brought unprecedented economic progress in the developing world, which now produces 
half of global GDP and is expected to account for almost three quarters of global growth by 
2017. It has been a less auspicious time for developed countries, evidenced by the epic Financial 
Crisis of 2008–09 and its consequences for the United States and Europe. 
As the fortunes of nations ebb and flow, it is important to distinguish between cycles and 
trends. Recent statistics suggesting an upswing in advanced countries and decreased growth in 
emerging markets divert our attention from the most important story about the world economy 
since the end of the Second World War, even as it continues to unfold. Namely, that through 
their struggle to reject failed models of development such as dependency theory and central 
planning—often at the behest of advanced-nation governments in the past—a critical mass of 
developing countries turned themselves around by embracing the true key to success: a 
disciplined approach to economic policy. 1
Discipline is a sustained commitment to a pragmatic growth strategy executed with a 
combination of temperance, vigilance, and flexibility that values the long-term prosperity of all 
over the short-term enrichment of any single group (Henry, 2013). Figure 1, which we 
constructed using data from the International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook (WEO) 
database and which plots the average growth rate of real GDP in advanced as well as emerging 
and developing economies from 1980 through 2012, tells the central story that the rest of this 
 
                                                 
1 For the origins of dependency theory see Prebisch (1950) and Singer (1950). 
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article develops in some detail. In addition to the well-documented contraction of advanced 
economies during the Great Recession of 2008–09, the figure presents two salient facts.  
Figure 1. GDP Growth in Emerging and Developing Economies Has Increased Relative to That of Advanced Ones 
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First, the growth rate of real GDP in the developing world has been dramatically higher 
in the last two decades than it was in the 1980s. Between 1980 and 1992, the average growth rate 
of real GDP in developing countries was 3.4 percent per year versus 5.4 percent from 1993 to 
2012. The significance of this two-percentage-point increase in growth is profound: for a country 
whose population grows at 1 percent per year, annual GDP growth of 3.4 percent means that per 
capita income doubles once every 29 years; with 5.4 percent growth, per capita income doubles 
in just 16. 
Second, excluding the years 2007–2012, which was a period of slower growth in 
developed countries because of the recession—a negative shock that had little to do with 
developing countries per se—there has been no substantive decline in advanced-country fortunes 
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following the acceleration of growth in the developing world. Developed countries grew by 2.9 
percent per year from 1980 to 1992—almost identical to the 2.8 percent rate at which they 
expanded from 1993 to 2007. There is little if any evidence to support an argument that faster 
growth in the emerging world came at the expense of average living standards in advanced 
nations. 
The relatively flat line for growth in advanced economies also suggests that the 
accelerated rise of living standards in developing countries was not caused by an aggregate shock 
to the global economy, but points to the idiosyncratic set of reforms (e.g., inflation stabilization 
and trade liberalization) that were adopted during the 1990s as an unprecedented number of 
countries rejected ideological approaches to economic policymaking and instead embraced 
discipline. The pages ahead provide specific illustrations of discipline, seen through the lens of 
economic reform in the developing world—a story of turnaround in three acts, each of which 
offers practical lessons for welfare-improving outcomes. 
 
I. The Trade Trap: Discipline Avoids Mercantilism 
The recent slow growth in advanced nations has lured their governments into the 
mercantilist trap of thinking that exports are good, imports are bad, and a large trade surplus is 
the key to renewed prosperity. Measured by the number of protectionist measures imposed since 
November 2008, France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom are all on the list of the 
world’s top 10 most protectionist countries (Evenett, 2013). The opening act of economic reform 
in the developing world—South Korea’s rise from impoverished nation in the 1950s to 
manufacturing juggernaut—predates the WEO’s time series on global growth, but it 
demonstrates that discipline in the context of free trade lies not in running surpluses but in 
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driving up productivity through a sustained process of easing restrictions on both imports and 
exports. 
In the 1950s, the Cold War occupied center stage, and countries like Singapore and South 
Korea were far from the economic “tigers” they would become. In keeping with dependency 
theory, the dominant intellectual paradigm in the developing world at the time, both countries 
eschewed trade with developed nations in order to pursue a policy of industrialization through 
import substitution, but the strategy was not successful in either country. As of 1960, South 
Korea’s GDP per capita was US$1,100. Evaluating South Korea’s prospects for the future at the 
time, the U.S. Congress argued there was “little or no hope for sustained growth,” while World 
Bank studies claimed “industrial growth in Korea was not feasible.”2
In 1964, the Korean government confronted the shortcomings of import substitution and 
began liberalizing trade. The reduction of import restrictions was a key element of Korea’s 
successful pivot to export-oriented growth. Although policymakers maintained high tariffs on a 
wide range of imports, they understood that certain capital goods, intermediate inputs, and 
transportation equipment were vital for production and therefore the country’s economic 
development. Accordingly, they created a minimal “positive” list of permissible investment 
goods that they allowed to expand over time. By 1967, the commitment to opening up had grown 
to the point where policymakers replaced the previous list with a “negative” one—a new 
protocol under which importers were automatically granted permission for any item not 
enumerated. 
 
Korea’s import liberalization strategy had at least two positive effects on the economy.  
First, it reduced the cost of production by providing workers and firms with critical inputs at 
lower prices. Second, it enabled Korean companies to reverse-engineer everything from 
                                                 
2 Krueger (2010). 
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automobiles to electronic equipment, effectively importing new technologies that would have 
taken decades to develop in isolation. Working with government-supported research and 
development organizations (ranging from the Korean Institute of Machinery and Metals to the 
Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute), Korean companies were able to 
assimilate and improve upon a variety of technologies that helped them leapfrog the learning 
curve and become world-class firms such as Hyundai and Samsung. 
The Korean government unquestionably played a significant role in the country’s rise to 
economic prominence, and critics of economic reform often cite this involvement as evidence 
that extensive government intervention and industrial policy are viable alternatives to more 
market-oriented economies. But this critique misses the larger point. The key to Korea’s 
turnaround was not so much an ideological tilt toward a large role for government as it was the 
discipline to enact and sustain policy changes that empowered firms to take advantage of the 
international marketplace. For example, the decision in 1964 by Korean policymakers to devalue 
the won helped drive the success of their import liberalization strategy. By offsetting the impetus 
for real exchange-rate appreciation created by Korea’s remaining import barriers, the devaluation 
restored external competitiveness and set the stage for the takeoff of the country’s manufacturing 
sector. 
The Korean government’s willingness to reject import substitution and embrace trade 
radically altered the country’s economic trajectory. From 1960 to 2005, Korea’s average 
standard of living increased twelvefold, with imports and exports working together to drive 
productivity gains from comparative advantage. Korean exports increased from 4.8 percent of 
GDP in 1963 to 34 percent in 1980. Over the same period, imports as a fraction of GDP rose 
from 15.9 percent to 41.4 percent. It bears emphasizing that Korea’s trade balance was negative 
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in both 1963 and in 1980. Indeed, between 1965 and 1990, Korea grew by 7.1 percent per year 
while running persistent trade deficits. 
 
II. Fiscal Follies: Discipline Does Not Equal Austerity 
From international trade to public finance, the appropriate role of government in 
economic activity remains a controversial topic. The Great Recession triggered a contentious 
debate over whether fiscal consolidation (austerity) is helpful or harmful in restoring developed 
economies to full employment and sustainable debt trajectories. These debates intensified during 
the U.S. sequestration standoff and deliberations over the European Fiscal Compact. 
Economic commentators from both ends of the political spectrum mistakenly conflate 
discipline with the false courage to implement extreme policies. When it comes to whether to 
impose fiscal austerity, however, studying the historical (and objective) responses of developing-
country stock markets to implementation of austerity programs demonstrates the error of 
unyielding views. Thirty years of data from emerging markets suggest that the disciplined course 
of action depends largely on the prevailing level of inflation in the country at the time austerity is 
being considered. 
The stock market is a useful tool for determining what discipline means in the context of 
fiscal policy, because it internalizes both the short- and long-run effects of austerity (Henry, 
2002). To the extent that austerity creates expectations of slower growth and higher discount 
rates in the short run, it will depress present values. But the potential of higher growth and lower 
discount rates in the long run creates an offsetting effect. If the expected long-run benefits 
outweigh the short-run costs, then the country’s stock market will rise when its government 
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announces an austerity program. If the expected costs outweigh the benefits, the market will fall. 
If the anticipated net effect is zero, there should be little to no market reaction. 
The response of the Brazilian stock market to President Henrique Cardoso’s plan to end 
hyperinflation in 1994 illustrates this kind of cost-benefit analysis at work. The Cardoso 
government instituted fiscal consolidation, unveiled a new currency (the Real) and stopped 
printing money to pay its bills. In the anticipation of the Real Plan, the Brazilian stock market 
experienced cumulative abnormal returns of 75 percent in real dollar terms during the twelve-
month period prior to implementation. The plan worked. Over the course of the next three years 
Brazil went from hyperinflation to single-digit annual price increases. The permanent reduction 
in inflation along with other economic reforms placed the economy on a new path. The growth 
rate of Brazilian GDP in the two decades beginning with stabilization was 3.2 percent per year—
no Asian miracle, but 1.2 percentage points faster than in the prior decade. Growth was 
particularly strong between 2001 and 2011—3.6 percent per year—a time during which the 
combination of growth and antipoverty measures lifted twenty million Brazilians out of poverty. 
Unlike Brazil in the early 1990s, inflation was not the principal problem facing Chile 
when its policymakers implemented austerity under three successive agreements with the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) between 1983 and 1989. (The Pinochet regime ended triple-
digit inflation in the 1970s.) In anticipation of the future economic impact of austerity, Chile’s 
stock market experienced negative cumulative abnormal returns in each of the twelve-month 
periods preceding the agreements. Across all three episodes of cold-turkey approaches to 
macroeconomic stabilization, the average cumulative abnormal return was negative 87 percent. 
In line with these negative market forecasts, real GDP also fell sharply and did not return to its 
pre-recession level until 1986. 
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The differing reaction of the stock market to austerity programs conditional on the level 
of inflation is not a phenomenon exclusive to Brazil and Chile. Figure 2 demonstrates that 
average cumulative abnormal returns of 44 percent occurred in response to the twenty-five 
separate austerity programs announced in the midst of high inflation (greater than 40 percent) 
across twenty-one emerging nations between 1973 and 1994. Conversely, the fifty-six separate 
programs announced in the midst of moderate inflation (less than 40 percent) triggered average 
cumulative abnormal returns of negative 24 percent. 
Figure 2. The Stock Market Responds Negatively to Fiscal Austerity Programs Initiated in the Midst of Moderate Inflation 
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With inflation rates in the United States and the Euro Area below 2 percent in 2010, 
Figure 2 suggests that, rather than changing swiftly from stimulus to austerity that year, a more 
gradual approach to fiscal consolidation for those countries might have been optimal. Indeed, 
Europe’s prolonged decline in economic activity in the aftermath of the Great Recession stands 
in contrast to the rapid recovery experienced by East Asia following its own crisis in 1997 
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(caused by similar factors such as property booms and excess leverage). At least part of the 
difference in the post-crisis paths of employment and output in the two episodes appears to be a 
result of greater fiscal flexibility on the part of Asian policymakers than their European 
counterparts (Chari and Henry, 2014). 
A gradual approach to deficit reduction need not imply a lack of seriousness—altering 
the speed of progress toward a specified fiscal target is not the same as abandoning it. On the 
contrary, gradualism can be a powerful tool in helping achieve the objectives of a broader growth 
strategy (Dewatripont and Roland, 1995). The goal is not to balance the budget in one fell 
swoop, but to implement positive net present value measures that place government debt on a 
sustainable trajectory. 
 
III. Discipline Applies to Borrowers and Lenders  
When public debt does hit crisis-inducing levels, historical data on stock-market 
responses in emerging markets also provide important insights about the most efficient way to 
address the debt overhang and insolvency that inhibit the recovery of European countries such as 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. Because there are many parallels between the 
economic troubles of Europe and the landscape of heavily indebted, middle-income developing 
countries in the late 1980s, the policy changes that resolved overhang following the Third World 
Debt Crisis are deeply relevant to advanced economies. A quick review of events and data 
demonstrates the following principle: when a government’s liabilities exceed its ability to pay, 
discipline requires borrowers and lenders to bear the burden of adjustment in order to reach an 
efficient resolution. 
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Following seven years of restructurings and forgone growth in the Crisis countries, and 
despite prior insistence that debt relief had no place in the solution, the U.S. Treasury changed 
tack in 1989. Then-Secretary of the Treasury Nicholas Brady unveiled a plan that called on 
international commercial banks to provide approximately US$65 billion of debt forgiveness to 
the sixteen nations in question. The anticipation of the official announcement of a Brady deal 
generated average cumulative abnormal returns of 60 percent over a twelve-month 
preannouncement window in the stock markets of the recipient countries. It is tempting to 
conclude that the revaluation of assets simply reflected a transfer of wealth from bank 
shareholders, but additional data reject this explanation. Publicly traded U.S. commercial banks 
with large developing-country loan exposure experienced average cumulative abnormal returns 
of 35 percent during the relevant time frame. 
Debt relief, however, also carries a price tag. It was given to Brady countries in exchange 
for their agreement to implement growth-enhancing reforms: inflation stabilization, trade 
liberalization, and privatization of badly run state-owned firms whose lack of profitability was a 
drag on public finances and helped give rise to debt overhang in the first place. Countries that 
instituted and sustained subsets of the reforms that were most relevant to their circumstances 
experienced significant improvements in economic performance. Countries that failed to honor 
their reform commitments (Jordan, Nigeria, and the Philippines) experienced a much smaller 
initial rise in the value of their stock markets than other Brady countries—30 percent versus 60 
percent—and even those increases completely evaporated within a year as lack of commitment 
to reforms became obvious (Arslanalp and Henry, 2005). 
The lesson seems clear. Reducing the debt burden can be an important part of a pragmatic 
growth strategy for countries that suffer from debt overhang. But debt relief will only succeed 
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when implemented in concert with reforms that raise productivity and provide a business 
environment in which firms have an incentive to generate output, invest in capital, and hire 
additional workers. Resistance to writing down debts that cannot be repaid places Europe at risk 
for the extended malaise that has plagued Japan for two decades and stood in the way of Third 
World resurgence until Secretary Brady’s bold change of course. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
As advanced and emerging nations struggle to regain their footing in the aftermath of the 
Great Recession, they face somewhat different challenges. Developed nations seek to return their 
economies to pre-crisis levels of growth and employment while responsibly addressing income 
inequality. Developing countries must consolidate their hard-won gains of the past several 
decades and implement second-stage reforms required in key areas (e.g., infrastructure and labor 
markets) to maintain their high rates of catch-up growth. The historical examples presented in 
this article provide wisdom that applies with equal relevance to the varied tasks ahead. The 
analytical insight at the heart of each narrative is unique, but all three stories of economic 
transformation contain a common truth: discipline drives turnarounds. If both advanced and 
developing nations internalize the lesson and embrace a disciplined approach to economic 
policy, they can grow in concert and create greater prosperity for all. 
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